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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

Homeowners filed suit against the watershed district claiming
negligence for failing to warn of the danger and extent of flooding.
Homeowners also sought injunctive relief based on the violation of a
natural servitude of drain whenever the Lake rises above the normal pool
stage. Homeowners finally requested damages in place of injunctive relief.
The trial court rejected both of Homeowners claims. The trial court
determined that damages were prescribed as the flooding was common
occurrence prior to the 1991 flood, Homeowners had consented to the
alteration of the natural drain, and flooding was an act of God and did not
subject defendant to liability. Homeowners appealed this decision to the
Louisiana Court of Appeal.
Homeowners first alleged that the trial court had erred in prescribing
their request for damages. In affirming the trial court's prescription of
damages, the appellate court first articulated the two-year statute of
limitations for private property damaged for public purposes. The court
then determined that this statute does not apply when the damage did not
result from the public construction work. The court concluded that
Homeowners' damages resulted from flooding, but because the Lake was
not designed as a flood control device, the dangers of flooding should have
been apparent. Therefore, the Homeowners' claim of failure to warn fails
and damages were correctly prescribed.
Homeowners next alleged that the trial court had erred in not awarding
injunctive relief, or damages in lieu of injunctive relief, for violation of the
natural servitude of drain. The appellate court recognized that damages
may be appropriate in lieu of injunctive relief as an alternate remedy. The
court determined that such a servitude may be altered by agreement if it
does not adversely affect the public interest. The court analyzed the
servitude agreement and concluded that the Homeowners' ancestors in title
agreed to the alteration of the natural servitude of drain.
The court supported its conclusions by commenting on the evidence
presented which suggested that the flooding would have occurred even had
flood control measures been taken and that the flooding was clearly an act
of God. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of damages and
injunctive relief and assessed the costs of appeal to Homeowners.
Sarah E. McCutcheon
MASSACHUSETTS
Enos v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Envtl. Affairs, 719 N.E.2d
874 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that plaintiffs had standing to
maintain an action for alleged injuries which fell within the protection of
the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act).
The plaintiffs ("Landowners") were fourteen taxpayers who lived in
the town of Plymouth and owned property near the Eel River. Landowners
used the Eel River for recreational activities such as fishing, boating, and
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swimming. The Town of Plymouth ("Plymouth") committed violations of
water quality standards caused by it's method of sewage disposal. As a
part of a settlement agreement, Plymouth agreed to construct a wastewater
treatment plant and other facilities needed to comply with the
Massachusetts Clean Waters Act. The Secretary of the Executive Office of
Environmental Affairs ("Secretary") required Plymouth to submit a Final
Supplemental Environmental Impact Report ("FEIR") for review under the
Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act ("MEPA"). Plymouth submitted
a FEIR with regard to a proposed sewage treatment plant which disposed
of permitted amounts of treated sewage through an existing outfall pipe,
with the remainder channeled into the groundwater of the Eel River
watershed. The proposed plant was also located in the immediate vicinity
of Landowners' properties.
After the Secretary's approval of Plymouth's FEIR and the issuance of
a compliance certificate, Landowners brought suit to declare the
Secretary's certificate invalid because the town's FEIR did not comply with
MEPA and furthermore, that another FEIR was required for review.
Landowners alleged that reasonable foreseeable injuries to the use,
enjoyment, and value of their real property would occur if Plymouth's
sewage treatment plant went forward due to the pollution of the Eel River
and offensive odors the plant would produce. The lower court granted the
Secretary's motion to dismiss on the ground that Landowners lacked
standing to maintain their action. The lower court accepted the Secretary's
argument that Landowners' injuries, if any, would stem from the town and
not the Secretary.
The Massachusetts Appeals Court concluded that Plymouth's FEIR
failed to satisfy the requirements of MEPA and determined the Secretary's
certificate of compliance presumptively invalid. The court then turned to
the issue of whether Landowners had standing to bring the action. The
Secretary argued that Landowners failed to show a causal connection
between their alleged injuries and the Secretary's decision that the FEIR
complied with MEPA. The court determined the critical question was
when does an alleged injury become legally cognizable. After analysis of
prior case law, the court concluded that a party that alleges an injury within
the area of concern of the statute or regulatory scheme under which the
injurious action had occurred has standing. Thus, the central issue became
whether Landowners' alleged injuries fell within the area of concern of
MEPA.
The court found the primary concern of MEPA was to protect and
minimize damage to the environment caused by agency actions. The court
concluded that MEPA uses the administrative process and the
environmental impact report to accomplish this goal. The court held
Landowners' alleged complaints and injuries fell into the area of concern
which MEPA and its administrative process were designed to protect. In
reaching the decision, the court looked to Landowners' allegations of
environmental damage if the project went forward without adhering to the
review process and improving the defective FEIR. The court reversed the
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Karen McTavish

